act – Empathy

The Non-primordiality of Empathy

Aside from the claim that empathy is primordial, Stein would contend that empathy is non-primordial. The question now is, in what sense?

According to Edith Stein, empathy is non-primordial in its content. Her first warrant for this is that there are acts that are non-primordial in content. She brings into the discussion the acts of memory, fantasy and expectation, which are primordial as an act, but non-primordial in content.

Now, her second warrant is that in empathy, while the act is primordial, the experience is foreign (i.e. not mine). Stein says that the object of empathy is precisely another subject, which is wholly different from me. In contrast to the contents of my other acts which I claim to be mine, the experience in empathy is someone else’s.

This specific non-primordiality (i.e. grasping the experience of another individual) makes Stein think that empathy is a sui generis act of perception.

The Primordiality of Empathy

The act of empathy is a primordial experience. It is an act that I, as the subject, do. Indeed, it is my act.

The primordiality of the act of empathy is part of Edith Stein’s general claim that empathy is “an experience of foreign consciousness in general.” She breaks down this claim into two sub-claims: (1) empathy is a primordial act (or “originary” for some texts) and (2) empathy is a non-primordial experience.

Stein opens up the claim of primordiality with a warrant that the object of empathy is in the “here and now.” In other words, in the act of empathy, the object directly faces me, without any mediation. Stein’s ground for this is the “seeing” of the pain of someone in the bodily expression of pain. This perception of someone’s pain is direct and immediate. She supports the warrant in saying that outer perception (i.e. the act that grasps physical expressions) does not give us the experience of pain.

So, for Stein, empathy is primordial as an act, analogous to outer perception. It is primordial because it is a present experience (i.e. happening here and now) when executing. Thus, when I empathize with someone, I directly perceive the experience of the individual without any detour to anything.

The Act of Reflection

Reflection is a special term in phenomenology. Edith Stein uses it to mean a “looking-at” the experience itself, especially of the experience of empathy.

The acts of the subject are considered experiences. Perceiving the laptop in front of me is an experience. Empathizing with my mother about the slowness of the internet connection is an experience. Reflection, itself, is an experience.

Image by My pictures are CC0. When doing composings: from Pixabay

The act of reflection does not “go out,” unlike the other acts (e.g. outer perception and empathy). Rather, it looks at the subject’s experience of the object. So, when I “reflect,” in the phenomenological sense, I am focusing on my own experience at the moment. I go out from myself to look at my experience from a certain distance.

What is unique with reflection is that it captures the relationship of the subject and its lived experience. That is why when the subject reflects, it always shows the subject’s intimacy with the experience at the moment.

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