Just a brief recap, the individual, for Edith Stein, is a psycho-physical individual. It is composed of the psychic, which is the unifying principle, making the individual a separate being. And it is also composed of the physical. In the individual, both are intrinsically tied to each other. Stein says, “[T]he soul is always necessarily a soul in a body (p. 41).”
I will now attempt to analyze the physical aspect of the individual. Following Stein’s division, it will be sub-divided into five: (1) the givenness of the living body, (2) the living body and feelings, (3) soul and living body, psycho-physical causality, (4) the phenomenon of expression, and (5) will and living body. For this post, I will only analyze the first one, leaving the others to be analyzed in the succeeding posts.
The Givenness of the Living Body
Here, Edith Stein is trying to work out the relationship between the living body and the physical body of the individual. Outwardly perceived, the individual’s body is seen as merely physical. It has particular characteristics, like shape and size. In other words, it occupies space and goes through time. But the individual’s body is peculiarly special because it is also living. It is not just a thing comparable to a table or pen, but it is animated. Indeed, Stein says that the living body is an embodiment, that is, a soul in a body.
The inherent connection between the two lies in sensation. For Stein, “sensations are among the real constituents of consciousness… The sensation of pressure or pain or cold is just as absolutely given as the experience of judging, willing, perceiving, etc. (p. 42)” Meaning to say, it is part of the individual’s substantial unity of experience. But, Stein would point out that sensation is unique because it is localized, unlike the other acts (p. 42). It is localized, in the sense that it is found in the body and not in the “I.”
Because of sensation, the living body would now have various points of orientation. There would, then, be a spatial relationship among the “I,” sensation found in the living body, and the outside world. The distance between sensation and the “I” is close, very close indeed, albeit never in it. Different parts of the body can be said to be relatively near or far from the “I.” It depends on where the raw data enters (e.g., head for vision). Thus, the “I” is non-spatial and is always the zero point of orientation relative to the parts of the body.
But the unity of the “I” and sensation, forming the living body, makes the living body the zero point of orientation relative to objects outside of it. The individual would then be able to show that it is “here,” and the objects are “there.” The distance, then, of foreign objects can be said to be relatively close or far depending on their proximity to the living body of the individual. But Stein notes that sensation will always be the one nearer to the “I” than a foreign object, even if directly sensed (p.43).
Stein says, “For the living body is essentially constituted through sensations, sensations are real constituents of consciousness and, as such, belong to the ‘I.’ Thus how could there be a living body not the body of an ‘I’ (p. 48)!”
P.S. Everything above is based on Edith Stein’s On the Problem of Empathy.
P.P.S. This is not exhaustive. I omitted a lot from what Stein stated in this part of her book.
Empathy 