In her doctoral dissertation On the Problem of Empathy, Edith Stein brings into the discussion Lipps’ account of empathy, appreciating its merits while at the same time being critical. Doing this, Stein further clarifies the essence of empathy.
While she agrees that empathy is an “inner participation,” Stein disagrees with the radical interpretation that in empathy there is a tendency for “full experiencing,” that the empathized experiences become the empathizer’s own experiences. It is as if their experiences collide and become one.
Of course, Stein would say that this is not the case because my experiences are my own, and the other’s experiences remain his or her own. This is the non-primordial character of empathy. I do not become the other, and the other does not become me. Individuality is preserved even in the most intimate level of empathy.
Stein says that Lipps conflated the fulfilling explication of empathy and the relationship of primordiality and non-primordiality. It is not that in empathy the foreign experience become my own, but rather this foreign experience may motivate me to produce other acts, which are primordial to me (e.g. sympathy).
Empathy 