According to Edith Stein, empathy is “the experience of foreign consciousness in general, irrespective of the kind of the experiencing subject or of the subject whose consciousness is experienced (p. 11).”
I constantly go back to this definition of empathy because I believe, and obviously, it is crucial for my thesis. The Steinian definition of empathy given above is broad. It is probably because Edith Stein was establishing it as an act revealing the presence of other individuals. Precisely, this is the background in which Stein explored empathy. It was the fact that, as Stein pointed out in her dissertation, the subject has an awareness of other individuals. How this is so, the act of empathy is the answer. So, for Stein, regardless of the nature of the subjects, the knowledge and experience they have with each other are based on the act of empathy.
*All of the above is based on Edith Stein’s On the Problem of Empathy.
The individual, for Edith Stein, is a psycho-physical individual. It is composed of the psychic, which is the unifying principle, making the individual a separate being. And it is also composed of the physical. In the individual, both are intrinsically tied to each other. Stein says, “[T]he soul is always necessarily a soul in a body (p. 41).”
In this last analysis of the psycho-physical individual in the lens of inner perception, Stein would first differentiate bodily expressions coming from feeling and bodily expressions coming from the will. So far, Stein explored how feelings play a vital role in the constitution of the psycho-physical individual. But here, she explores the will as also a vital element of the constitution of the psycho-physical individual. For Stein, an action that is merely due to a feeling is not a “volitional decision.”
Stein says, “[L]ike feeling, neither is it [will] isolated in itself, having to work itself out. Just as feeling releases or motivates volition from itself… so will externalizes itself in action. To act is always to produce what is not present (p. 54-55).” The will, then, is not complete in itself. Rather, it fulfills itself in action. Similar to the relationship between feelings and expression, the will “terminates” in an action. And action is something that tries to realize something that is not yet the case.
The will, thus, is creative (p. 56). In this sense, the will does a “special effect” in the individual, that is, it intervenes in the causal connection of things (p. 56). This happens when the individual just decides something (i.e., have a conviction) for himself or herself and acts on it. The will is the “yes” of the individual. When he decides to change himself to have a better character and do it, that is the will. When she decides to accept her maternal responsibility and do it, that is the will. When he decides to propose to his girlfriend and do it, that is the will. The will, thus, fulfills itself in action.
For Stein, the will is the master of the soul (p. 55). Yes, it may be causally influenced. When the living body is tired, for example, the individual may not have the will to do some things. But it is precisely within the power of the will that the individual may still do the thing despite the tiredness. This makes the will truly creative. Stein says, “Every creative act in the true sense is a volitional action (p. 56).”
*All of the above is based on Edith Stein’s On the Problem of Empathy.
Just a brief recap, the individual, for Edith Stein, is a psycho-physical individual. It is composed of the psychic, which is the unifying principle, making the individual a separate being. And it is also composed of the physical. In the individual, both are intrinsically tied to each other. Stein says, “[T]he soul is always necessarily a soul in a body (p. 41).”
I will now attempt to analyze the physical aspect of the individual. Following Stein’s division, it will be sub-divided into five: (1) the givenness of the living body, (2) the living body and feelings, (3) soul and living body, psycho-physical causality, (4) the phenomenon of expression, and (5) will and living body. For this post, I will only analyze the first one, leaving the others to be analyzed in the succeeding posts.
The Givenness of the Living Body
Here, Edith Stein is trying to work out the relationship between the living body and the physical body of the individual. Outwardly perceived, the individual’s body is seen as merely physical. It has particular characteristics, like shape and size. In other words, it occupies space and goes through time. But the individual’s body is peculiarly special because it is also living. It is not just a thing comparable to a table or pen, but it is animated. Indeed, Stein says that the living body is an embodiment, that is, a soul in a body.
The inherent connection between the two lies in sensation. For Stein, “sensations are among the real constituents of consciousness… The sensation of pressure or pain or cold is just as absolutely given as the experience of judging, willing, perceiving, etc. (p. 42)” Meaning to say, it is part of the individual’s substantial unity of experience. But, Stein would point out that sensation is unique because it is localized, unlike the other acts (p. 42). It is localized, in the sense that it is found in the body and not in the “I.”
Because of sensation, the living body would now have various points of orientation. There would, then, be a spatial relationship among the “I,” sensation found in the living body, and the outside world. The distance between sensation and the “I” is close, very close indeed, albeit never in it. Different parts of the body can be said to be relatively near or far from the “I.” It depends on where the raw data enters (e.g., head for vision). Thus, the “I” is non-spatial and is always the zero point of orientation relative to the parts of the body.
But the unity of the “I” and sensation, forming the living body, makes the living body the zero point of orientation relative to objects outside of it. The individual would then be able to show that it is “here,” and the objects are “there.” The distance, then, of foreign objects can be said to be relatively close or far depending on their proximity to the living body of the individual. But Stein notes that sensation will always be the one nearer to the “I” than a foreign object, even if directly sensed (p.43).
Stein says, “For the living body is essentially constituted through sensations, sensations are real constituents of consciousness and, as such, belong to the ‘I.’ Thus how could there be a living body not the body of an ‘I’ (p. 48)!”
P.S. Everything above is based on Edith Stein’s On the Problem of Empathy.
P.P.S. This is not exhaustive. I omitted a lot from what Stein stated in this part of her book.
I would just like to have a rough sketch of what an individual is, the subject of experience. For Stein, the individual is a psycho-physical individual. But for the purposes of analysis, I will separate the two elements of the individual, and focus on the psychic. The physical aspect is tackled here. The following are based on Edith Stein’s On the Problem of Empathy.
The Pure I The individual is “‘itself’ and no other.” What it is is different from the “he” or “she.” It is, thus, just a “qualityless subject of experience,” a recognition of the subject’s uniqueness. For Stein, the individual is an individual, precisely because others are facing it.
The Stream of Consciousness The “I” is not merely a qualityless subject of experience. Instead, it is also a stream of consciousness. Stein indicates that the “I” does not have just one experience, but many experiences, past and present. An experience of the individual is set against the many experiences the individual has already gone through.
The Soul The soul is simply the “bearer” of experiences. It is the principle of unity for all experiences of the individual. The soul characterizes the subject’s “own,” and therefore unified, consciousness, separating it from the stream of experience of others.
Empathy 