Another disagreement with Lipps arises. And it is the case of the “feeling of oneness.” While Stein believes that there is a feeling of oneness, but it is not the position of Lipps.
For Lipps, there is a feeling of oneness, in the sense that the empathizer and the empathized become one. In other words, their experiences become exactly the same. Following this, there would a suspension of my real self due to the experience of empathy. I become the other.
However, Stein would say that Lipps’ position could not stand if “reflection” is brought into the picture. Sure, I might not have been aware of my own self when empathizing or that I was so absorbed into the empathized experience, but when I come to my senses and reflect about the experience, I know that the experience was non-primordial. So, in the end, what I experience as an empathizer is not mine, but another’s.
So, in contrast, Stein would say that properly speaking the feeling of oneness is the case of “we-feeling.” We-feeling means enriched sympathy. In other words, it is the act of sympathy enriched by empathy. This is proper to a group setting, where there are several members feeling the same feeling over the same event. The feeling of oneness here is when we know each other’s feelings to the point where each one of us identifies with the “we” (i.e. the group) rather than with ourselves.
Watching a concert together, then feeling the same intense feeling, and reacting in the same way is an example of this feeling of oneness.
Empathy 